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LYING, DECEPTION, AND 
THE VIRTUE OF TRUTHFULNESS: 
A REPLY TO GARCIA 
Thomas Williams 
In "Lies and the Vices of Deception," J. L. A. Garcia argues that lying is 
always immoral, since it always involves a motivation contrary to the prop-
er discharge of a morally determinative role. I argue that Garcia fails to 
show (i) that anyone who fails in the sub-role of information-giver thereby 
fails in a morally determinative role, (ii) that the sub-role of information-
giver is precisely that of "informing another truthfully," (iii) that lying devi-
ates from the motivation characteristic of someone with the virtue of truth-
fulness, and (iv) that lies always undermine the well-being of the person to 
whom they are told. 
In "Lies and the Vices of Deception,"l J. L. A. Garcia defends the sort of rig-
orist approach to lying that has lately fallen on hard times. After briefly 
expounding his version of virtue ethics, which serves as the theoretical 
underpinning for his arguments, he explains that lying is always contrary 
to virtue and therefore always immoral. Other forms of deception, he con-
tinues, are not contrary to virtue in the same way or to the same degree; 
although purposive deception is "presumptively vicious" (525), it need not 
be-as lying always is-impermissible. 
Unlike most philosophers nowadays, I do not rule out in advance any 
view according to which lying is always impermissible (although I have 
not been persuaded by any such view that has been offered to date); and I 
actually agree that lying is at least sometimes more seriously contrary to 
virtue than are other forms of deception. But despite my readiness to see 
merit in Garcia's conclusions, I do not find his arguments persuasive. 
Much like Kant on the same subject, Garcia indulges in hyperbolic lan-
guage that will move someone under its spell only so long as she can keep 
from asking herself what the naked facts look like without all the rhetorical 
clothing. I shall argue that there is nothing in Garcia's version of virtue 
theory that supports either claim: he does not show that lying is always 
impem1issible, or even that it is more seriously contrary to virtue than any 
other form of deception. 
For Garcia, a virtue is "a trait that counts towards someone's being good 
in one or another of certain personal role-relationships" (522). The traits in 
question will be dispositions to be motivated in certain ways. Goodness in 
a role-relationship is evaluated from the perspective of the patient rather 
than that of the agent: "whether [my motivational dispositions] fulfill those 
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relationships is a matter of whether, in having them, I live up to what those 
in whose lives I occupy those roles need and benefit from in having them 
filled" (523). Thus, I have a virtue when I (i) occupy a certain sort of role 
with respect to another person and (ii) am disposed to be motivated in 
ways that (iii) make me good in that role, where (iv) what makes me 
"good-in-a-pertinent-role-to-you ... is your need, your flourishing, your 
benefiting, your having a good life" (523). An action's being morally 
wrong or impermissible is then explained "in terms of its being distant 
from and opposed to virtue so to behave" (522). 
I will not stop to ask whether this is the right conception of virtue. 
Instead, let us assume that it is correct and then ask whether Garcia is right 
to think that lying is always seriously contrary to virtue as thus under-
stood. When one makes an assertion, one occupies "a special relation-
within-a-relation with those addressed" (524). This relationship is too 
fleeting and engages too little of one's moral self to make it a role, as Garcia 
acknowledges; but it constitutes a sub-role, that of "information-giver." 
This sub-role "can occur within many role-relationships that collectively 
compose the moral life" (524), and so goodness in discharging the sub-role 
can count towards goodness in discharging the larger roles. Hence, there 
are standards of virtue that apply to the sub-role of information-giver. 
Now at this point we might think that Garcia has shown only that stan-
dards of virtue will apply to our assertions whenever those assertions con-
tribute to our discharge of a special relationship with someone-so that it 
might turn out to be vicious to lie to friends or family members but not to 
strangers. But one of the morally determinative role-relationships Garcia 
recognizes is the relationship we have to "what Christians call 'neighbor', 
which applies to anyone insofar as she is conceived as somehow a fellow 
traveler in life's journey" (522).2 Thus (apparently) whenever we make an 
assertion to anyone at all, we occupy the sub-relationship of information-
giver in a morally determinative relationship. Our being good in that sub-
role will contribute to our being good in the larger role, and (more crucial-
ly) our deliberate subverting of that sub-role will constitute a subverting of 
the larger role. Knowingly to make a false assertion is to deviate in the 
greatest possible way "from the information-giver's (sub-role-)task of 
informing another truthfully. Other deceptions mislead but only lies really 
misinform" (525, emphasis in original). Lies, therefore, are always imper-
missible, because they always involve a full-blown deviation from good-
ness in some morally determinative role. 
This conclusion comes too quickly, however; four steps in the argument 
need further elaboration and defense. First, since Garcia has conceded that 
information-giving is not a role in itself, but a sub-role of larger morally 
determinative roles, he must show that one who deviates from goodness in 
the sub-role of information-giver will necessarily deviate from goodness in 
the larger role. Otherwise it could tum out that someone might violate the 
sub-role without violating any morally determinative role. Second, since he 
has said that virtue and vice involve the manner in which we carry out roles, 
he must show that he has properly characterized the (sub-) role of informa-
tion-giver as that of "informing another truthfully." 1£ the role is more prop-
erly characterized in some other way, it could tum out that one could some-
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times misinform another person and nonetheless not deviate from virtue. It 
could also turn out, contrary to what Garcia hopes to show, that misinform-
ing someone will be no more vicious than misleading her. Third, since he 
has associated virtue so closely with motivation, he cannot show that lying is 
vicious without showing that it deviates from the motivation characteristic of 
someone who has the virtue of truthfulness. So we need an account of the 
motivation that operates in the truthful person before we can assess the 
turpitude of someone who lies, or even see whether all lies deviate from that 
motivation. Fourth, since goodness in a moral role is supposed to be mea-
sured by the need, benefit, or flourishing of the patient, Garcia must show 
that lies always undermine the well-being of the person to whom the lie is 
told. It seems to me that Garcia fails to provide persuasive arguments on 
any of these points. I shall take each point in turn. 
For the first point I shall assume that anyone who lies is violating the 
sub-role of information-giver (an assumption I call into question below in 
discussing the second point) and ask whether Garcia gives us any reason to 
believe that such a violation will necessarily constitute a violation of some 
larger morally determinative role. I cannot see where he does this. It is not 
even plausible to think this is the case within friendship. If my best friend 
asks me whether he did well at his last AP A presentation, and I reassure 
him that he did quite well even though in fact I think he was made to look 
rather foolish, I have not behaved badly to him as a friend~r at least it is 
not obvious that I have, and Garcia gives me no reason to think I have. 
'Friendship', in fact, is not a univocal term; it names a variety of relation-
ships with differing expectations, degrees of intimacy, and purposes. For 
that reason I suspect it would be a hopeless task to derive so specific an 
injunction as the requirement never to lie from any considerations about 
lithe role" of friendship. Now if (as in my example above) I were to lie to 
my best friend, I would be failing him as a friend; but that is because of the 
particular nature of our friendship, where it is understood that we will be 
honest even under such circumstances. We have an implicit agreement to 
be truthful with each other. But Garcia cannot avail himself of this move, 
since he does not wish to ground the immorality of lying in any implicit 
promises to be truthful; and it seems clear that there are some friendships 
worthy of the name in which no such agreement exists. In fact, it seems 
plausible to think that in certain sorts of friendship, and under certain cir-
cumstances, one would be required to lie in order to be good as (that sort of) 
friend. Suppose that what my friend wants, needs, and expects from me 
when asking a certain question is reassurance; suppose also that I cannot 
be both reassuring and truthful. Under such circumstances I would surely 
be acting badly as a friend if I told the discouraging truth instead of offer-
ing a reassuring lie. So goodness as a friend seems not only to be consis-
tent with lying, but even sometimes to require lying. 
When it comes to the generalized role of 'neighbor', it becomes even less 
plausible to suppose that a violation of the role of information-giver neces-
sarily constitutes a violation of the larger role. For one thing, I do not see 
how we can specify what it is to be good in so vague and diffuse a role 
without having specified in advance what good character is in general. 
What could it mean for me to be a good 'neighbor' (in the Christian sense 
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of that word) other than to be a good person in my dealings with whomev-
er I happen to encounter? So the notion of good person must be prior to 
the notion of good neighbor. 
Leaving that worry aside, though, and assuming that we can somehow 
identify independently what constitutes goodness in the role of neighbor, 
we must still be shown that lying automatically deviates from goodness in 
that role. The closest we find to such an argument is Garcia's contention 
that lying constitutes treachery: 
In asserting p to you, I present myself as someone for you to trust (on 
p itself, at least). It is this personal connection, this 'sub-role', that I 
establish and offer you in making the assertion, and that I also betray 
in an especially egregious way when I act with intentions diametri-
cally opposed to what I should intend when so connected to you: 
specifically, the intent that you possess the truth on p, which inten-
tion would count towards my fulfilling my part of the connection 
that I offer. That is to say, I betray you in this when I lie. (528) 
But essential to the concept of betrayal is that I have a special relation-
ship with the person I have betrayed. I can harm or degrade or insult a 
complete stranger, but I cannot betray her. If I harbor a fugitive and then 
decide to tell the police his whereabouts, I have betrayed him; but if I mere-
ly see a fugitive running past and then inform his pursuers which direction 
he took, I cannot be said to have betrayed him, though I may have harmed 
him in some other way and perhaps even done him an injustice. So what-
ever might be happening when I lie to Kant's celebrated murderer when 
he comes to my door, it certainly is not betrayal. 
Garcia wants to insist, of course, that there always is such a special rela-
tionship when T make an assertion, even to Kant's murderer: "the agent 
lures the aggressor with assurances that she can depend on the agent in 
this respect, all the while planning the double-cross on that very matter .... 
[T]he liar acts with ill will inasmuch as she means to seduce her audience 
into a relationship of trust and dependence for purposes of betraying it" 
(529-530). Now we can agree that someone who behaves in the way Garcia 
describes is treacherous and vicious, but as a description of my lying to the 
murderer this is purely fanciful. I have not lured or seduced anyone into 
anything. And I see no reason to suppose that being a good neighbor to 
someone requires me never to encourage her in a false belief. As Garcia 
acknowledges, virtue is compatible with the use of force; it would follow 
that I can be a good neighbor to someone against whom I am using force, 
even (under the right circumstances) to someone whom I am killing.3 Is 
lying so much more serious than force that it is never compatible with 
goodness as a neighbor? As Duns Scotus observed, "It is less bad to take 
away true opinion from one's neighbor, or to be the occasion of generating 
false opinion in him, than to take away his bodily life. Indeed, there is 
scarcely a comparison."4 
Garcia's arguments in fact suggest that he does not take seriously 
enough his own identification of information-providing as a sub-role. He 
makes no real effort to show how badness as an information-provider nec-
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essarily involves badness in a larger role. He seems to think, in other 
words, that information-providing is itself a morally determinative role. 
Thus we come to my second point. Supposing that information-providing 
reaIIy is a morally determinative role, has Garcia characterized that role 
properly? According to him, what is central to performing well as an 
information-giver is to be committed to the information-recipient's having 
the truth about the very proposition one asserts. Therefore, if I mislead 
without actually lying, I have not deviated so badly from my role as infor-
mation-provider that I am thereby guilty of doing something morally 
wrong (though there is a defeasible presumption that I have done so). 
I find this restriction purely stipulative. It is wholly arbitrary to define 
information-giving so that it just means asserting propositions one believes 
to be true. As part of an argument, the definition is probably also question-
begging. Garcia argues that lying is always wrong because it seriously 
undermines one's role as information-provider, but the role of informa-
tion-provider turns out to consist, by definition, precisely in not lying. 
Furthermore, a reasonable, non-stipulative understanding of the role of 
information-provider will not support the distinction Garcia wishes to 
draw between lies, which are always immoral, and deception, which is 
only presumptively immoral. Suppose (to adapt one of his examples) that 
a colleague who missed the department colloquium asks me how the 
speaker'S talk went. Now it was a perfectly brilliant piece of philosophy, 
but I am filled with ill-will towards the speaker, so with raised eyebrows 
and a devious smirk I tell my colleague, "Well, there was certainly nothing 
wrong with her grammar." Apart from the desire to save the traditional 
distinction between lying and other forms of deception, is there any reason 
at all to think I have done better as information-provider than I would 
have if I simply said, "It was awful"? 
Consideration of my third point might help Garcia's case here. Virtue, 
according to Garcia, is supposed to be bound up with our motivations. 
The person with the virtue of truthfulness, in other words, is one who is 
characteristically motivated in a certain way. If it can be shown that lying 
is more seriously contrary to that motivation than any other form of decep-
tion, the traditional distinction can perhaps be saved. Unfortunately we 
run into a problem similar to the one I have complained about with respect 
to Garcia's description of the information-provider's role. He identifies the 
characteristic motivation of the truthful person as follows: "it is S's com-
mitment to A's having the truth about what she asserts-p itself-that is 
central to S's being good in her sub-role of A's information-provider" (526-
527). But we need further argument to show that the characteristic motiva-
tion of the honest person is a commitment to other people's having the 
truth about exactly those propositions that she asserts to be true-in other 
words, a commitment not to lie. I would argue that so stingy a commit-
ment to truth is not enough to justify characterizing someone as honest. 
For a commitment not to lie is compatible with all sorts of low cunning, 
dissimulation, hypocrisy, conniving, suppression of truth, and the like. To 
describe as honest someone who is habitually motivated to act in any of 
those ways seems clearly mistaken. Recall the example of my crafty 
answer to my colleague's question. Isn't my answer, technically truthful 
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though it is, every bit as contrary to the usual motivation of the honest per-
son as an outright lie would have been? 
Of course, even if we answer yes to that last question, I have done no 
more than undermine the distinction between lies and other forms of 
deception; it could still be true--as far as the present argument goes-that 
all lies are immoraP (Then all deception would tum out to be immoral as 
well.) As long as the honest person is characteristically motivated never to 
lie (even if, as I have suggested, her motivation qua honest person is not 
exhausted by her commitment not to lie), all lies would turn out to be 
immoral. But is that indeed part of the characteristic motivation of the 
honest person? On an Aristotelian conception of honesty, the honest per-
son will be one who deals truthfully with others insofar as truthful dealing 
with others conduces to or in part constitutes her good qua human. An 
Aristotelian who wanted to maintain a rigorist position on lying would 
therefore be obligated to show that no person of practical wisdom could 
ever see a lie as anything other than a deviation from her proper good. 
Such a view has little intuitive plausibility, and I cannot imagine how one 
would go about constructing an argument for it. 
Now Garcia is not an Aristotelian on this issue, so the argument he must 
make is somewhat different. For him-and here we come to our fourth 
and final point-the goodness of virtuous motivation is not to be found in 
the well-being or flourishing of the virtuous agent but in that of the patient. 
If he is to answer the challenge I have posed, therefore, he must show that 
lies always harm the person to whom they are told. I find three arguments 
for this claim. First, the very inordinateness of a lie "consists in and consti-
tutes an injury to the neighbor, even if it causes her no further harm" (528, 
emphasis in original). What is that inordinateness? It "consists in the con-
trariety of the action's motivational input to the sort of motivation someone 
in the neighbor's position needs for the information-giver to live up to the 
spirit of her role" (528). We have already seen that this answer will not do. 
The role of information-giver is not itself morally determinative, and bad-
ness in that role does not entail badness in any role that is morally determi-
native. Moreover, it has not been established that the motivational input 
involved in lying is necessarily contrary to the characteristic motivation of 
the honest person. Finally, the argument is viciously circular. It is intend-
ed as proof that lies injure the person lied to because they diminish her 
well-being. But this injury is said to consist in the fact that the liar's moti-
vation is contrary to what the person lied to needs, i.e., to some constituent 
of her well-being. Now the element of well-being at issue here cannot be 
anything other than the state of not having been lied to. So the argument 
amounts to this: lying to someone harms her because it makes it the case 
that someone has lied to her.6 
The second argument for the claim that lies always harm the person lied 
to is that lies always involve betrayal. I have already cast doubt on the 
notion that lying essentially involves betrayal, so there is no need to deal 
further with that contention. The third argument is that lying always 
degrades the person to whom the lie is told. Garcia argues that "[t]o 
degrade or manipulate is to treat with contempt, and contempt is an indig-
nity and therefore a violation of the dignity and respect that ground 
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human rights" (529). But Garcia acknowledges that it can sometimes be 
licit to kill a would-be attacker. Now we can either say (implausibly) that 
in killing the attacker we do not treat him with contempt, degrade him, or 
manipulate him; or we can say (more plausibly) that we do indeed treat 
him with contempt (and so forth), but justifiably so. If we take the first 
option in describing cases of force, it would seem also to be available for 
describing cases of deception: we could say with equal plausibility that in 
lying to Kant's murderer we are not treating him with contempt. Similarly, 
if we take the second option in describing cases of force, we can take it in 
describing cases of deception: we could admit that we are treating the 
would-be murderer with contempt, but insist that we are justified in doing 
so. After all (to return to Scotus's point) if the right not to be deprived of 
life is defeasible, the right not to be lied to is surely defeasible. 
For all these reasons I remain unpersuaded that Garcia's virtue theory 
implies an absolute prohibition of lying. It seems quite possible for some-
one to lie without contravening the motivation that typically operates in 
someone with the virtue of honesty, without doing unjustified harm to the 
person to whom the lie is told, and without acting badly in any morally 
determinative role.7 
University of Iowa 
NOTES 
1. Faith and Philosophy 15 (1998): 514-537. 
2. One might well wonder at this point whether the notion of a role-rela-
tionship has been so emptied of specificity that we are now working with a 
Kantian wolf in an Aristotelian sheep costume, but I will not pursue that worry 
here. 
3. As an alternative, one might say that neighborliness does exclude the 
use of force, but there are some people with respect to whom neighborliness is 
not morally required. This alternative would obviously not help Garcia's case, 
since even if neighborliness excludes lying, lies to those who fall outside the 
required scope of neighborliness might be licit. 
4. Ordinatio 3, d. 38, q. un., n. 5. Minus enim malum est auferre proximo 
opinionem veram, vel occasionaliter generare in eo opinionem falsam, quam 
auferre sibi vitam corporalem; imo non est quasi comparatio. 
5. I do, however, take my argument under the first point to have estab-
lished that Garcia has given us no good reason to think all lies are immoral. 
6. Could Garcia save his argument by identifying the element of well-
being as the possession of true belief? No, because deception of any form 
would undermine that. 
7. I am grateful to John Corvino, Richard Fumerton, and Diane Jeske for 
their helpful comments. 
